On Critical Social Research
I am a self-identified critical social researcher, and all-around critical thinker. I’m usually not one for labels, but my critical perspective is so important to my identity as an academic and a person that I am happy to wear it on my sleeve.
To me, this means that my work, and my sociological imagination, are informed by a commitment to scepticism driven by a praxis associated with an emancipatory (social justice) project.
My scepticism is directed at many things, but particularly at truth claims related to structures and institutions of hegemony, power, and social control. This involves the deconstruction and ‘unpacking’ of policies, discourses, and narratives. These locations of critique are all related to the study of text and language (and imagery), and their relationship to the construction of lived reality – following from Wittgenstein’s observation that ‘the limits of our language are the limits of our world.’
In terms of a commitment to a broad emancipatory project, I am influenced by the works of penal abolitionists such as Tomas Mathiesen and Louk Hulsman, and by the social philosophy of Jurgen Habermas. The abolitionist commitment to a relatively focused critical praxis provides a sense a purpose, a goal to be achieved, and a beacon by which to navigate what could otherwise be generally pessimistic terrain (as critical research tends to focus on systemic injustices, social problems, and the abuse of power). Additionally, the abolitionist approach tends to emphasize a very close proximity between the subjects and objects of social research, often blurring the lines between scholarship and activism. While this may present certain challenges, it also provides a constant reminder of the very real, very immediate, and very human aspects of social research – something that is too often missed in efforts to produce detached, objective research. For his part, Habermas contributes an interdisciplinary, reflexive (reflective, self-aware), contextualized, and practical sociological philosophy (or philosophical sociology). His broad-spectrum approach to critique is rooted in the identification of wrongs, and the pursuit of rights, where the latter are defined as those things that contribute to the further emancipation of contemporary society. From the abolitionists, then, I take a commitment to critical praxis and an understanding of the importance of proximity to one’s research. From Habermas, I take a particular view of the researcher as public intellectual committed to a grand (albeit, never realized) social project.
Beyond these things, I believe critical social research is – or at least, ought to be – sensitive to and informed by history when dealing with contemporary phenomena. Foucault’s work on the ‘history of the present’ is particularly instructive in this regard. History produces context, and context shapes lived reality. To forget this is to embrace a naïve vision of periodicity and to (through accidental or wilful ignorance) gloss over the origins of ongoing trends.
So, scepticism, emancipation and social justice, and an understanding of history are key elements of critical social research, in my opinion. What else? I previously mentioned the importance of language, of text and imagery. To this list, I would add an acknowledgement of the impact of social class and market dynamics. Regardless of whether one chooses to interpret ‘the history of conflict as the history of class struggle,’ there can be no doubt that any commitment to an emancipatory project must be informed by an understanding of the systemic barriers to emancipation, social justice, and equality.
I won’t presume to call this a complete or even thoroughly organized description of critical social research, but it does offer some insight into the considerations that are forefront in my mind when I think about critical analysis. Over the next year, I plan to add to and refine this statement, bringing in additional theoretical, epistemological, and methodological elements.
Please feel free to comment.
- Mike
To me, this means that my work, and my sociological imagination, are informed by a commitment to scepticism driven by a praxis associated with an emancipatory (social justice) project.
My scepticism is directed at many things, but particularly at truth claims related to structures and institutions of hegemony, power, and social control. This involves the deconstruction and ‘unpacking’ of policies, discourses, and narratives. These locations of critique are all related to the study of text and language (and imagery), and their relationship to the construction of lived reality – following from Wittgenstein’s observation that ‘the limits of our language are the limits of our world.’
In terms of a commitment to a broad emancipatory project, I am influenced by the works of penal abolitionists such as Tomas Mathiesen and Louk Hulsman, and by the social philosophy of Jurgen Habermas. The abolitionist commitment to a relatively focused critical praxis provides a sense a purpose, a goal to be achieved, and a beacon by which to navigate what could otherwise be generally pessimistic terrain (as critical research tends to focus on systemic injustices, social problems, and the abuse of power). Additionally, the abolitionist approach tends to emphasize a very close proximity between the subjects and objects of social research, often blurring the lines between scholarship and activism. While this may present certain challenges, it also provides a constant reminder of the very real, very immediate, and very human aspects of social research – something that is too often missed in efforts to produce detached, objective research. For his part, Habermas contributes an interdisciplinary, reflexive (reflective, self-aware), contextualized, and practical sociological philosophy (or philosophical sociology). His broad-spectrum approach to critique is rooted in the identification of wrongs, and the pursuit of rights, where the latter are defined as those things that contribute to the further emancipation of contemporary society. From the abolitionists, then, I take a commitment to critical praxis and an understanding of the importance of proximity to one’s research. From Habermas, I take a particular view of the researcher as public intellectual committed to a grand (albeit, never realized) social project.
Beyond these things, I believe critical social research is – or at least, ought to be – sensitive to and informed by history when dealing with contemporary phenomena. Foucault’s work on the ‘history of the present’ is particularly instructive in this regard. History produces context, and context shapes lived reality. To forget this is to embrace a naïve vision of periodicity and to (through accidental or wilful ignorance) gloss over the origins of ongoing trends.
So, scepticism, emancipation and social justice, and an understanding of history are key elements of critical social research, in my opinion. What else? I previously mentioned the importance of language, of text and imagery. To this list, I would add an acknowledgement of the impact of social class and market dynamics. Regardless of whether one chooses to interpret ‘the history of conflict as the history of class struggle,’ there can be no doubt that any commitment to an emancipatory project must be informed by an understanding of the systemic barriers to emancipation, social justice, and equality.
I won’t presume to call this a complete or even thoroughly organized description of critical social research, but it does offer some insight into the considerations that are forefront in my mind when I think about critical analysis. Over the next year, I plan to add to and refine this statement, bringing in additional theoretical, epistemological, and methodological elements.
Please feel free to comment.
- Mike
posted by Mike Larsen at 3:22 PM
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